- Meeting 23 : Tue, Feb 24, 11:00 am-11:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Introduction to Matchings with Preferences. Stable marriage problem. Gale and Shapley algorithm.
References: | Stable Marriage: Structure and Algorithms by Irving and Gusfield. (Chapter 1).
|
- Meeting 24 : Wed, Feb 25, 10:00 am-10:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Gale Shapley continued. Proof of man-optimal stable matching.
References: | Stable Marriage: Structure and Algorithms by Irving and Gusfield. (Chapter 1).
|
- Meeting 25 : Thu, Feb 26, 08:00 am-08:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Some more properties of stable matchings. Popularity of stable matchings. Towards a lattice structure.
References: | Stable Marriage: Structure and Algorithms by Irving and Gusfield. (Chapter 1).
See also lecture notes: http://www.cse.iitm.ac.in/~meghana/matchings/stable.pdf
|
- Meeting 26 : Fri, Feb 27, 02:00 pm-02:50 pm
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Lattice Structure of the stable marriage problem. Generalization like incomplete lists and ties. All stable matchings of an instance with incomplete lists have the same size.
References: | Stable Marriage: Structure and Algorithms by Irving and Gusfield. (Chapter 1).
|
- Meeting 27 : Mon, Mar 02, 11:00 am-11:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Stable matchings with ties and incomplete lists. Kiraly's paper. A 2/3 approximation algorithm for computing maximum cardinality stable matchings. (Restricted case of one sided ties allowed).
A useful lemma on the way: A matching which avoids augmenting paths of length upto (2k-1) is a k/k+1 approximation to the maximum matching.
References: | http://www.cs.elte.hu/egres/tr/egres-08-04.pdf
|
- Meeting 28 : Tue, Mar 03, 11:00 am-11:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Finished proof for 2/3 approximation algorithm. A sketch of the algorithm and the proof technique for 3/5 approximation for the general case (when both sides can have ties).
References: | http://www.cs.elte.hu/egres/tr/egres-08-04.pdf
|
- Meeting 29 : Wed, Mar 04, 10:00 am-10:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Application of stable matchings to Dintiz Problem on list coloring Grid Graphs.
References: | Proofs from the Book. Chapter 33.
cage.ugent.be/~kn/thebook.pdf
|
- Meeting 30 : Thu, Mar 05, 08:00 am-08:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Application of stable matchings to Dintiz Problem on list coloring Grid Graphs.
References: | Proofs from the Book. Chapter 33.
cage.ugent.be/~kn/thebook.pdf
|
- Meeting 31 : Fri, Mar 06, 02:00 pm-02:50 pm
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
To Be Announced
- Meeting 32 : Tue, Mar 10, 11:00 am-11:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Stable Room-mates problem. An algorithm to decide whether the instance admits a stable matching.
References: | See the orginial and self explanatory paper by Rob Irving.
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~pat/jchoco/roommates/papers/Comp_sdarticle.pdf
|
- Meeting 33 : Wed, Mar 11, 10:00 am-10:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Stable Roommates continued. 2-phase algorithm. Phase-1 similar to Gale and Shapley. Invariants on reduced preferences at the end of phase 1.
Phase 2 involving rotations (equivalently all-or-nothing cycle). Elimination of rotation to reduce preference lists further.
References: | See the orginial and self explanatory paper by Rob Irving.
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~pat/jchoco/roommates/papers/Comp_sdarticle.pdf
|
- Meeting 34 : Thu, Mar 12, 08:00 am-08:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Finished discussion of phase 2 for stable roommates.
Some practical questions -- what when stable matchings do not exist? What are alternative solutions.
Some structural questions:
Does the property (analogous to stable matchings in marriage problem) hold in the roommates case:
Given 2 stable matchings, for every person pick up the partner he prefers better amongst the 2 matchings. Prove or disprove that this choice leads to a stable matching.
Consider 3 stable matchings in the roommates instance
and for every person, choose the median of the 3 partners he gets in 3 matchings. Show that such a choice leads to a matching and then show that it is a stable matching.
- Meeting 35 : Fri, Mar 13, 02:00 pm-02:50 pm
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Discussion on One sided preferences.
Rank Maximiality, definition, reduction to maximum weight matchings.
Popular matchings. Definition. Strict lists. A characterization of popular matchings in terms of f and s posts.
References: | https://people.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~mehlhorn/ftp/PopularMatchingsJournal.pdf
|
- Meeting 36 : Tue, Mar 17, 11:00 am-11:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Popular matchings characterization with ties. O(m sqrt(n)) algorithm.
References: | https://people.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~mehlhorn/ftp/PopularMatchingsJournal.pdf
|
- Meeting 37 : Wed, Mar 18, 10:00 am-10:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Popular matchings: switching graph characterization for strict lists.
Answer the following questions efficiently:
1. How many popular matchings does the instance admit?
2. Given an edge (a,p) does there exist some popular matching that contains the edge (a,p)?
References: | http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/publications/PAPERS/9011/PopMatchTechRep.pdf
|
- Meeting 38 : Thu, Mar 26, 08:00 am-08:50 am
References | |
Exercises | |
Reading | |
Quiz 2.